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I. Introduction 
High-level radioactive nuclear wastes are 
highly dangerous and there are no facilities in the 
world which can permanently and safely store it. 
In November 2015, after more than 30 years of 
efforts, Finnish government firstly approved a 
construction of such a store, a ‘deep underground 
repository’, in Olkiluoto. Similarly, Swedish gov-
ernment is currently considering a license to build 
a facility in Forsmark. In France a nuclear-waste 
agency ANDRA hopes to apply for a license to 
build a facility in Bure in 2017 (Gibney).
Where to put a repository is the main prob-
lem. Most countries do not use deep under-
ground stores, but store their spent nuclear fuel 
above ground in temporary storage facilities. In 
Germany, salt formations at Gorleben had been 
studied for decades, but the government called 
off the work in 2000. The United States selected 
a site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada in 1987, but 
its government wanted to scrap the idea in 2010. 
In Japan, United Kingdom and Canada, govern-
ments　have declared plans to build deep geolog-
ical repositories, but have yet to begin the thorny 
process of picking sites (Gibney).
At present, although researches on the ways 
how to get rid of nuclear waste continue, most 
countries agree that the permanent underground 
burial is the best solution (Irvine: 58–61). In this 
research, from a perspective of green criminology, 
following questions are considered: With 100,000 
years deep underground nuclear waste reposi-
tory, can we keep it safely without troubles and 
accidents for such a long time? How is the ‘prob-
lematique’ of high-level nuclear waste geological 
disposal?
II. Positive Evaluation: Safety and Ne-
cessity of Deep Geological Reposito-
ry/ Disposal 
1. Radioactive waste management and its 
safety
World Nuclear Association (WNA) explains a 
radioactive waste management and emphasizes its 
safety as follows.
WNA explains that some radioactive wastes 
「桐蔭論叢」第 36 号 2017 年 6 月 特集Ⅰ　現代法の諸相と展開
Takemura Noriyoshi : Professor, Faculty of Law, Toin University of Yokohama. 1614 Kurogane-cho, Aoba-ku, 
Yokohama 225-8503, Japan
Takemura Noriyoshi
16
are produced in the nuclear fuel cycle, and the 
relatively modest cost of managing and disposing 
of this is part of the electricity cost. At each stage 
of the fuel cycle proven technologies are used to 
dispose radioactive wastes safely. While for low- 
and intermediate-level wastes these are mostly 
being implemented, for high-level wastes some 
countries await the accumulation of enough of it 
to warrant building geological repositories, others 
have encountered political delays. Unlike other in-
dustrial wastes, the level of hazard of all nuclear 
waste, its radioactivity diminishes with time. Each 
radionuclide contained in the waste has a half-
life, the time taken for half of its atoms to decay 
and thus for it to lose half of its radioactivity. 
Radionuclides with long half-lives tend to be 
alpha and beta emitters, making their handling 
easier, while those with short half-lives tend to 
emit the more penetrating gamma rays. Eventually 
all radioactive wastes decay into non-radioactive 
elements. The more radioactive an isotope is, the 
faster it decays (World Nuclear Association). 
Then WNA emphasizes its safety that the main 
objective in managing and disposing of radioac-
tive waste is to protect people and the environ-
ment. This means isolating or diluting the waste so 
that the rate or concentration of any radionuclides 
returned to the biosphere is harmless. In order to 
achieve this, all wastes are practically contained 
and managed, some clearly need deep and per-
manent burial. None is allowed to cause harmful 
pollution from nuclear power generation. All toxic 
wastes need to be dealt with safely, not just ra-
dioactive wastes. In countries with nuclear power, 
radioactive wastes comprise less than 1% of total 
industrial toxic wastes (World Nuclear Associa-
tion; Nuclear Energy Agency/ Radioactive Waste 
Management Committee).
2. Geological disposal of radioactive waste and 
its necessity
European Commission (EC) explains a geo-
logical disposal of radioactive waste as the best 
way and insists its necessity as follows.
EC explains that since the development of nu-
clear power in the 1950s, it has been proposed for 
many years that the most appropriate and natural 
way of dealing permanently with our radioactive 
wastes is to return them to the ground. Careful 
burial in well-engineered repositories at various 
depths below the land surface at specially selected 
sites is the favored solution in every country that 
has decided how to handle the problem (European 
Commission: 4). 
Then EC insists its necessity that the burial at 
several hundreds of meters depth in stable rock 
environments, ‘geological disposal’, is the option 
for disposal of the most hazardous radioactive 
wastes because it will provide permanent safety, 
not just for ourselves but for future times very 
much longer than the whole of past human history. 
Although we currently store all our wastes safe-
ly and make every effort to minimize the amount 
of radioactive waste that we produce, it is inevi-
table that there will always remain some wastes 
that have to be disposed of deep underground. The 
European Union has been researching geological 
disposal for almost 30 years and is on the verge of 
constructing its first deep repositories (European 
Commission: 4).
III. Critical Evaluation: Dangerous and 
Deadly Legacy of Radioactive Waste
1. Hazardous for hundreds and thousands of 
years and no other solution than burying 
the problem
If we consider that high-level radioactive nu-
clear wastes could continue to be hazardous for 
hundreds of thousands of years, and that at pres-
ent there is no other solution to radioactive wastes 
than burying the problem, one may say that keep-
ing and depending on nuclear power means a dan-
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gerous waste of time.
Greenpeace explains that high-level wastes, 
which include materials containing highly-radio-
active elements, can be radioactive for hundreds 
of thousands of years and emit large amounts of 
hazardous radiation. Even a couple of minutes of 
exposure to high-level waste can easily result in 
fatal doses of radiation. Therefore it needs to be 
reliably stored for hundreds of thousands of years. 
Humankind has been on Earth for the last 200,000 
years, yet it takes 240,000 years for plutonium to 
be considered safe. The safe and secure storage 
of the dangerous waste needs to be guaranteed 
throughout this period, which potentially spans 
many Ice Ages. It’s no wonder that a solution for 
dealing with nuclear waste has still not been found 
(Greenpeace 2009: 4).
Then Greenpeace continues that the nuclear 
industry wants to bury the problem of radioactive 
waste by storing it in deep geological repositories. 
But it appears to be impossible to find suitable 
locations where safety can be guaranteed for the 
necessary timescales. Given the immense difficul-
ties and risks associated with the storage of dan-
gerous nuclear waste, it’s not surprising that the 
nuclear industry tries to dump it out of sight. De-
spite the billions already invested in research and 
development for dealing with radioactive waste, 
new experiments are still being presented as ‘solu-
tions’. Methods that will not be ready for a long 
time, may never be commercially viable or do lit-
tle to solve the long term waste problem (Green-
peace 2009: 5).
2. Rock solid? Scientific review of geological 
disposal
According to a scientific review of geolog-
ical disposal of high-level radioactive, contain-
ment barriers would lead to significant releases 
of radioactivity, and predicting such a complex, 
coupled processes over the long timescale is dif-
ficult. Unless such difficulties can be resolved, a 
significant release of radioactivity from a deep re-
pository could occur. The status of research and 
scientific evidence regarding the long-term under-
ground disposal of highly radioactive wastes is 
overviewed as follows.
Wallace explains that a number of phenomena 
are identified that could compromise the contain-
ment barriers, potentially leading to significant 
releases of radioactivity: Copper or steel canisters 
and overpacks containing spent nuclear fuel or 
high-level radioactive wastes could corrode more 
quickly than expected; The effects of intense heat 
generated by radioactive decay, and of chemical 
and physical disturbance due to corrosion, gas 
generation and biomineralisation, could impair 
the ability of backfill material to trap some radio-
nuclides; Build-up of gas pressure in the reposi-
tory, as a result of the corrosion of metals and/or 
the degradation of organic material, could damage 
the barriers and force fast routes for radionuclide 
escape through crystalline rock fractures or clay 
rock pores; Poorly understood chemical effects, 
such as the formation of colloids, could speed up 
the transport of some of the more radiotoxic el-
ements such as plutonium; Unidentified fractures 
and faults, or poor understanding of how water and 
gas will flow through fractures and faults, could 
lead to the release of radionuclides in groundwater 
much faster than expected; Excavation of the re-
pository will damage adjacent zones of rock and 
could thereby create fast routes for radionuclide 
escape; Future generations, seeking underground 
resources or storage facilities, might accidentally 
dig a shaft into the rock around the repository or a 
well into contaminated groundwater above it; Fu-
ture glaciations could cause faulting of the rock, 
rupture of containers and penetration of surface 
waters or permafrost to the repository depth, lead-
ing to failure of the barriers and faster dissolution 
of the waste; Earthquakes could damage contain-
ers, backfill and the rock (Wallace: 7).
Then Wallace continues that although comput-
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er models of such phenomena have undoubtedly 
become more sophisticated, fundamental diffi-
culties remain in predicting the relevant complex, 
coupled processes (including the effects of heat, 
mechanical deformation, microbes and coupled 
gas and water flow through fractured crystalline 
rocks or clay) over the long timescales neces-
sary. In particular, more advanced understanding 
and modelling of chemical reactions is essential 
in order to evaluate the geochemical suitability 
of repository designs and sites. The suitability of 
copper, steel and bentonite as materials for canis-
ters, overpacks and backfill also needs to be reas-
sessed in the light of developing understanding of 
corrosion mechanisms and the effects of heat and 
radiation. Unless and until such difficulties can be 
resolved, a number of scenarios exist in which a 
significant release of radioactivity from a deep re-
pository could occur, with serious implications for 
the health and safety of future generations (Wal-
lace: 7–8).
3. Deadly legacy of radioactive waste
(1) Failed solutions
We have seen many cases of failed solutions 
around the world.
According to Beránek et al., billions of euros 
have been spent over the past half-century on find-
ing a solution to the nuclear waste problem. But 
the attempts have all been unsuccessful (Beránek 
et al.: 3).
a) Russia, USA, France, UK, Netherlands, 
Japan and others: Waste dumping at sea
Low level radioactive wastes had been 
dumped at sea for years, based on the irrespon-
sible idea ‘out of sight and out of mind’. Disinte-
grating barrels had brought the wastes back into 
the environment and dangerous substances had 
been accumulated in bodies of animals. In 1993, 
an international treaty, which bans all dumping of 
radioactive waste at sea, was signed (Beránek et 
al.: 3).
b) Germany: Waste dump in water floods salt 
layers
In Asse, Germany, an experimental radioac-
tive waste dump had been set up in the 1960s in 
salt formations deep underground. A few years lat-
er it was discovered that it had started leaking wa-
ter in 1988 and is currently flooding with 12,000 
litres of water each day. As a result, all 126,000 
barrels of waste already placed in the dump now 
need to be cleared out. Asse was envisaged as a 
pilot project for a final storage solution in the salt 
layers under Gorleben, but there is now serious 
doubt in Germany about the viability of salt lay-
ers as storage for nuclear waste (Beránek et al.: 3; 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology).
c) France: Unknown waste inventory
One of the largest nuclear dumps in the world, 
the Centre de Stockage de La Manche (CSM) in 
northern France had been opened in 1969 to store 
low-level wastes, and it was closed in 1994. It 
currently stores 520,000m3 of radioactive mate-
rials from waste reprocessing and French nuclear 
reactors. A 1996 commission set up by the French 
government concluded that the site also contained 
long-living waste and high-level waste, and that 
the true inventory was effectively unknown. In 
2006 it was found that contaminated water from 
the site had already been leaking into an under-
ground aquifer, threatening the surrounding agri-
cultural land (Beránek et al.: 3; Agence Nationale 
pour la Gestion des Déchets Radioactifs (AN-
DRA) 2014).
d) USA: Seismic fault line compromises bed-
rock storage
In 1987, Yucca Mountain in Nevada, about 80 
miles north of Las Vegas, was designated as the 
site for long-term disposal of radioactive wastes 
in the United States. However, the US Geological 
Survey has found a seismic fault line under the site 
and there are serious doubts about the long-term 
movements of underground water that can trans-
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port deadly contamination into the environment. 
As a result of these problems and billions of dol-
lars in cost overruns, the US government stopped 
funding the project in early 2010. But some years 
later its political climate has changed again. The 
White House’s fiscal 2018 budget plan for the De-
partment of Energy includes 120 million dollars to 
restart licensing for the proposed Yucca Mountain 
nuclear waste dump (Beránek et al.: 3; Macfarlane 
et al.; Washington Reuters).
(2) New researches and challenges
Regardless of these failed solutions, and in 
order to overcome them, they are doing new re-
searches and challenges. Beránek et al. explain 
the present situation in Sweden, Finland, France 
and Belgium. In Europe, according to the DOPAS 
Project, the state-of-the-art researches and full-
scale experiments are currently in progress.
a) Forsmark, Sweden — Olkiluoto, Finland: 
Copper corrosion
In Sweden, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB 
(SKB) (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Manage-
ment Company) is tasked with managing Swedish 
nuclear and radioactive waste in a safe way. In the 
spring 2011, it applied for a license to build the 
Spent Fuel Repository in Forsmark in Östham-
mar and the encapsulation plant next to Clab in 
Oskarshamn. The regulatory authorities are cur-
rently considering the applications, and this will 
take several years. According to SKB’s current 
timetables, its construction can start on the re-
pository in the beginning of 2020 and it can be 
put into operation ten years thereafter. The reason 
why SKB selected Forsmark is that it is a site that 
offers good prospects for the long-term safety of 
the nuclear fuel repository. The rock is stable and 
homogenous, with few fractures and low water 
flows at depth (Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB 
(SKB) 2015; Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB 
(SKB) 2016). Sweden plans to pack waste in cast 
iron inserts in copper canisters and place them in 
holes bored in tunnel floors, 400–500 meters deep 
underground, surrounded by bentonite clay. Water 
is expected to make the bentonite clay expand so 
that it fills the cavities in the surrounding granite 
rock which would reduce groundwater movement 
(Beránek et al.: 4).
In Finland, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) 
and Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum) (produc-
ers of nuclear power-generated electricity) , being 
fully responsible for their own nuclear waste man-
agement, have established Posiva Oy to manage 
the disposal of spent nuclear fuel produced in their 
power plants and associated research and devel-
opment work. The construction of ONKALO, an 
underground research facility located in Olkiluo-
to, began in 2004. The facilities currently complet-
ed include personel and ventilation shafts, access 
tunnel, and technical rooms. ONKALO enables 
disposal research in actual conditions. The dispos-
al activities are scheduled to begin in about 2020 
(TVO, Fortum and Posiva). Finland adopted same 
way of disposal as Sweden (Beránek et al.: 4).
According to Beránek et al., the copper can-
isters were expected to survive corrosion for at 
least 100,000 years, but a recent research shows 
that they can fail in just 1,000 years or less. The 
build-up of hydrogen was produced as a result of 
corrosion. High temperatures from the canisters 
could also affect the clay buffer, while groundwa-
ter flows could bring the contaminants from any 
compromised containers into the biosphere. Fur-
thermore, Nordic countries will face at least one 
Ice Age in the coming 100,000 years, entailing 
extremely violent earthquakes, penetration of per-
mafrost to the disposal depth and below, potential 
intrusion of water and unpredictable changes in 
groundwater flows (Beránek et al.: 4).
b) Bure, France — Dessel, Belgium: uncer-
tainties of clay as a natural barrier
In France, L’ANDRA (Agence nationale pour 
la gestion des déchets) was established by la loi 
du 30 décembre 1991 (the December 1991 Waste 
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Act) as a public body in charge of the long-term 
management of all radioactive waste. It benefits 
from 20 years’ experience in the preparation of 
projects for the implementation of a repository, 
and demonstrates the feasibility of deep geologi-
cal disposal for HL (high-level) and IL-LL (inter-
mediate-level long-lived) waste and the safety of 
its solution. It also develops various construction 
and handling methods and processes, for which 
demonstrators and pilot models were built and 
tested. The performance of the disposal facility 
and the safety it provides are constantly reassessed 
via a series of methods developed and designed to 
integrate both the existing knowledge and system 
analysis. The Agency has developed a methodol-
ogy for the phenomenological analysis of reposi-
tory situation in order to describe and analyze any 
phenomenon likely to occur throughout the evolu-
tion of the repository, including over the long term 
(ANDRA; Agence Nationale pour la Gestion des 
Déchets Radioactifs (ANDRA) 2016).
According to Beránek et al., France and Bel-
gium are exploring clay as a natural barrier, while 
Sweden and Finland rely on man-made barriers to 
prevent leakage. The waste is to be contained in 
simple stainless steel canisters, which can corrode 
much faster than the Swedish copper ones. Hence, 
the French/Belgium concept relies on the natural 
clay formation to contain radioactivity. The cru-
cial question is whether it can be guaranteed for 
hundreds of thousands of years that no cracks or 
channels will form in the clay layers, which would 
cause water to leak in and out again, poisoning 
nearby aquifers (Beránek et al.: 4).
c) DOPAS Project: Full Scale Demonstration 
of Plugs and Seals
The Full-Scale Demonstration of Plugs and 
Seals (DOPAS) Project was a European Com-
mission (EC) programme of work jointly funded 
by the Euratom Seventh Framework Programme 
and European nuclear waste management orga-
nizations (WMOs). The DOPAS Project was un-
dertaken in the period September 2012 – August 
2016. Fourteen European WMOs, and research 
and consultancy institutions, from eight European 
countries participated in the DOPAS Project. The 
Project was coordinated by Posiva (Finland). A set 
of full-scale experiments, materials research proj-
ects, and performance assessment studies of plugs 
and seals for geological repositories were under-
taken in the course of the Project. The DOPAS 
Project aimed to improve the industrial feasibility 
of full-scale plugs and seals, the measurement of 
their characteristics, the control of their behavior 
in repository conditions, and their performance 
with respect to safety objectives. It also contrib-
utes to the implementation of geological disposal 
across Europe (The Full-Scale Demonstration of 
Plugs and Seals (DOPAS) Project: 3–4).
IV. Uncertainty and Complexity of Un-
derground
1. Substantial uncertainties of geologic repos-
itory
There are substantial uncertainties in geolog-
ical repository, and no guarantee that radioactive 
nuclides will not be released into the environment 
in the future. Critical problems of ‘uncertainty’ 
and ‘prediction’ are raised and discussed at this 
moment.
Macfarlane et al. explain that there are sub-
stantial uncertainties in the geologic repository far 
into the future, and there is no way to guarantee 
that a repository will not release radionuclides 
into the environment at some point in the future. 
As for a suitable and safe geological repository 
for high-level nuclear waste, there are uncertain-
ties, some of which can be reduced by additional 
work and research, and some are inherent to the 
extrapolation of the results of models over time 
and space. Can geologic and hydrologic processes 
be adequately understood in order to make predic-
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tions about radionuclide transport over geologic 
periods of time, especially once thermally hot ra-
dioactive waste has perturbed the natural system? 
(Macfarlane et al.: 3, 393–394).
They continue that a variety of factors make 
it difficult to predict repository behavior over 
geologic time. The environmental and chemical 
conditions of the repository evolve over time. This 
uncertainty arises from the difficulty of predicting 
interactions over tens to hundreds of thousands of 
years brought about by introducing a thermally 
and radioactively hot waste package into a com-
plex geologic environment. Furthermore, knowl-
edge about features, events, and processes is con-
tinually in flux. Over the long term, such factors 
may cause substantial divergence from the origi-
nal prediction, and may cause unexpected results 
(Macfarlane et al.: 394–395).
2. Models in predictions and no solution in 
sight
Macfarlane et al. insist that models of natural 
systems over geologic periods of time ignore the 
realities of the complexity of open systems over 
large timescales. Complex Earth systems prob-
lems, such as understanding the behavior of a re-
pository, require the cooperation and coordination 
of many different values and diverse perspectives. 
Models of Earth systems cannot be validated 
because they attempt to simulate open systems, 
which exchange matter and energy with their sur-
roundings. In open systems, there is no way to 
know all the input parameters or processes, or to 
assess the boundary conditions that might affect 
the system. For geologic timescale, it is unfeasible 
to anticipate all input parameters for all process-
es that will occur over the modeled time period 
(Macfarlane et al.: 397–398).
They continue that investigations into past re-
actions among minerals and fluids in rocks show 
that ‘equilibrium’ may be rarely reached, and 
therefore it is almost impossible to decipher the 
detailed history of a rock, let alone predict reac-
tions into the geologic future. Geology has not ad-
vanced far enough yet to expect that it can do this. 
The problem is that the agency does not know all 
the features, events, and processes that will affect 
a repository over geologic timescales (Macfarlane 
et al.: 397, 399–400). According to Alley et al., 
any chosen course will be an imperfect solution. 
The problem is just too big, too complex, and too 
long. As investigations proceed, surprising should 
be expected and this expectation acknowledged 
from the outset (Alley et al.: 325).
3. Global Challenges
There are a number of difficulties to be solved 
in deep disposal of highly radioactive waste. 
Among four phases (construction, operation, tran-
sient and long term), especially latter two are too 
difficult to solve.
Pusch et al. explain that the transient phase 
is the time span with the most complex process-
es and interactions during repository lifetime. The 
waste still produces heat and the heavily distorted 
hydraulic and mechanical states are trying to get 
back to equilibrium conditions. Oxygen trapped in 
the system causes chemical reactions and enhanc-
es microbial activity in the repository. Analysis of 
all these processes demonstrates their complexity 
and show the problems that are faced in investigat-
ing this phase in the laboratory. Major problems 
are associated with time — the thermal pulse will 
last for several hundreds to thousands of years and 
re-saturation processes are delayed because of the 
low hydraulic conductivity of argillaceous rock. 
Total equilibrium will not be reached before sev-
eral tens to hundred thousands of years. The long-
term behavior of a repository is the most import-
ant feature for evaluating the safety conditions and 
performance of a repository but no experiments 
in underground laboratories can be conducted to 
simulate this phase adequately. The evident crit-
ical issues in long-term performance prediction, 
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beyond the problems that attend development of 
prediction models, are: (a) the lack of actual data 
from laboratory experiments and field studies, and 
(b) incomplete understanding of the kinetics of re-
actions both short-term and long-term abiotic and 
biotic reactions (Pusch et al.: 297–298).
As a result, based on the research by the 
Greens/EFA, we can conclude as follows.
Although there are at hand basic approaches to 
restrict the possible impacts of the hazard potential 
of the waste, but that there is no option available to 
completely eliminate the potential hazard. There 
are also problems to pass the responsibility for the 
radioactive waste onto succeeding generations and 
the high degree of uncertainty when forecasting 
social developments (social system, safety culture, 
economic attitude) for more than a few decades. 
The alleged safety is solely based on retrospec-
tively collected empirical data and on restricted 
current knowledge of the respective point of time. 
An exact proof of long-time safety cannot be sci-
entifically provided today and also not within the 
foreseeable future according to present knowledge 
(The Greens/EFA: 29–30).
In addition, according to Rana, a clear demon-
stration about safety aspects of nuclear waste 
management would help in gaining public and po-
litical confidence in any possible scheme of per-
manent nuclear waste disposal. A common public 
desire is retrievability of finally disposed waste 
in case repository fails to isolate wastes from the 
live environment. But desire of retrievability is in 
direct contradiction with the principle of final dis-
posal and adds serious complexities to the prob-
lem (Rana). 
V. Conclusions
Although there is an international consensus 
among nuclear experts that nuclear waste can be 
safely disposed of in a geologic repository, but 
after many decades of effort, we have only one 
geologic repository licensed to receive high-level 
waste. The technical issues and the accompanying 
uncertainties related to predicting the long-term 
behavior of a geologic repository are and will con-
tinue to be a challenge (Macfarlane et al.: 4).
On the system and modelling level, as central 
as natural systems are to the concept of geologic 
disposal, one must account for the inevitable and 
inherent ‘uncertainties’ in modeling the behavior 
of geologic systems, particularly over long time 
spans (many hundreds of thousands of years) and 
great distances (tens of kilometers). We must face 
the problem of high-level nuclear waste disposal 
and its long-term solutions. While geologic re-
positories may offer the best solution, we must 
endeavor to understand the ‘complexity’ and ‘un-
certainty’ of the multidisciplinary science that is 
required to support this strategy (Macfarlane et 
al.: 5).
On the policy level, a public policy is complex 
subject. It requires the consideration of a number 
of technical as well as social parameters. Policy 
for the high level nuclear wastes disposal is a mul-
tifaceted issue and it requires to resolve a number 
of inter-related problems. In situations like dispos-
al of HLW, comprehensive evaluation of policy 
success is extremely important as implications of 
a failure can be serious for the present and future 
life at earth. There are stringent complications in 
assessment of the involved risks due to unpredict-
ability of future geophysical events over a long 
time scale of more than 100,000 years (Rana).
In short, there are a number of difficulties to 
be solved in deep underground repository/disposal 
of highly radioactive waste. Among four phases 
(construction, operation, transient and long term), 
especially latter two are too difficult to solve. The 
state-of-the-art researches and full-scale exper-
iments are currently in progress. However, there 
are substantial uncertainties in geological repos-
itory/disposal, and no guarantee that radioactive 
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nuclides will not be released into the environment 
in the future. Critical problems of ‘complexity’ 
and ‘uncertainty’ are raised, and will continue to 
be discussed. The problem is just too complex and 
too uncertain.
[Notes]
1) This article is a part of results of ‘Research on Envi-
ronmental- and Eco-crimes by Progress of Scientif-
ic Technologies and Development of Societies and 
Measures against Them 2015–2019’ supported by 
the Grant-in-Aid of Scientific Research by Japanese 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology. 
2) This article is based on the three papers. The first 
was titled ‘Radioactive Waste Disposal into Deep 
Underground: Green Criminological Consideration 
of ‘Intergenerational Environmental Crime’’ and pre-
sented at the 70th Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of Criminology, San Francisco, CA, U.S.A., 
November 19–22, 2014. The second was titled ‘Leg-
acy of Deep Underground Nuclear Waste: ‘Treasure 
Box’ or ‘Pandora’s Box’ for the Present and Future 
Generations?’ and presented at the 16th Annual 
Conference of the European Society of Criminol-
ogy, Münster, Germany, September 21–24, 2016. 
The third was titled ‘100,000 Years Nuclear Waste 
Deep Underground Repository: Can we keep it safe-
ly without troubles and accidents for such a long 
time?’ and presented at the 72nd Annual Meeting of 
the American Society of Criminology, New Orleans, 
LA, U.S.A., November 16–19, 2016.
3) In order to do this research I joined the DOPAS 2016 
Seminar and visited three sites concerning geolog-
ical disposal of high-level and low-level radioac-
tive nuclear waste. The DOPAS 2016 Seminar took 
place in Turk, Finland 25th–26th May 2016, with a 
site visit to Olkiluoto on 27th May 2016. Over 110 
participants representing WMO’s, TSO’s regulators, 
university persons etc. from around 50 organizations 
and 16 countries worldwide attended the Seminar. 
As on-the-spot investigations, I visited Äspö Hard 
Rock Laboratory of SKB, Oskarshmn, Sweden on 
26th August 2016, Le Centre de Meuse/Haute-Marne 
(CMHM) de L’ANDRA on 30th August 2016, and 
Le Centre de Stockage de la Manche (CSM) de 
L’ANDRA on 1st September 2016. I am grateful to 
my colleagues Ms. Johanna Hansen (Posiva), Mr. 
Pär Grahm (SKB), and M. Richard Poisson (L’AN-
DRA).
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